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Abstract
Peer-to-peer applications enable users to create a
communications framework from scratch without the
need of a central service provider. This is achievable
via the aggregation of resources each one of them pro-
vide, creating a completely distributed collaborative
environment. Under some circumstances, groups of
users operating in a global peer-to-peer network may
need to create a closed communities, limiting access
to the shared resources only to its members. This can
be useful for security reasons or in order to provide
scoping within the global overlay network. In order
to achieve this scenario, security mechanisms must be
implemented. In this paper, a method for peer group
access control is presented managed only by the group
members in an completely autonomous way without
the need of any third parties.
Keywords: Access control, peer-to-peer, distributed
systems security, web of trust.
1 Introduction
Peer-to-peer is a communications model in which all
involved parties must collaborate in order to provide
basic services, such as content or messaging, and as-
sumes that all peers have equivalent capabilities. This
is in contrast with client/server architectures, where
the centralized server manages all basic services and
clients are intrinsically less capable. A major chal-
lenge when dealing with this kind of architecture is
that the topology of a peer-to-peer network is dynam-
ically changing as peers may go online and off-line. It
is no longer possible to rely on a central server which
is always online. That is the very reason why peers
must collaborate in order for the network to correctly
operate.
Usually, peer-to-peer applications are conceptual-
ized as a global overlay network without any kind of
logical segmentation or segregation as far as resource
availability is concerned. Any peer may access any
resource available in the network just because of the
fact that it is able to reach the peer itself that pro-
vides such resource. The users may use any shared
resource if they can locate it.
JXTA [1] introduced the concept of peer group as
a collection of peers that have a common set of in-
terests. Sometimes, the possibility of creating dif-
ferent (but not necessarily disjoint) groups of peers
operating under the same overlay network is deemed
interesting or necessary. There may be several moti-
vations, the most typical ones being:
• A secure environment. Peer group boundaries
permit member to access and publish protected
contents. Peer groups form logical regions whose
boundaries limit access to the peer group re-
sources, in a way similar to a VPN [2], but oper-
ating at application layer.
• A scoping environment. Peer groups define the
search scope for resource lookup. Peer groups
may be used in order to limit the amount of mes-
saging exchanges in which a peer takes part. By
doing this, only those messages deemed interest-
ing by each peer will be processed, or, at least,
traffic may be limited to a manageable amount.
• A monitoring environment. Peer groups permit
peers to monitor a set of peers for any special
purpose, including heartbeat, traffic introspec-
tion, and accountability.
In order for peer groups to be able to operate ef-
fectively in a global peer-to-peer network, additional
security services must be provided. This mechanisms
should allow peers to be able to prove group mem-
bership to other members of the group, so they can
be granted access to group resources. The interest-
ing challenge is the fact that, because of the nature
of peer-to-peer, these services must be provided by
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the peers themselves in a decentralized manner and
cannot rely on external parties.
It must be noted that even though the concept of
peer group was defined under peer-to-peer distributed
environments, it may as well be applied to the general
field of ad hoc networking, since the basic principle is
the same: a group of users are able to create a com-
munication infrastructure from scratch without the
need of a central service provider. In mobile wire-
less environments, this is equivalent to a group of
nodes creating a network which cannot be accessed
by other nodes even though they are within trans-
mission range.
1.1 Paper contributions
In this paper a secure and scalable method in order to
provide group access control and check group mem-
bership in a peer-to-peer environment is presented.
The approach takes into account the nature of peer-
to-peer networks, being fully decentralized and pay-
ing special attention to the autonomy of its members
and to self-organization. Each peer should initially
only manage information directly related to itself in a
manner that all necessary services are provided by its
members, avoiding dependency from external group
entities.
1.2 Paper organization
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents
current proposals for access control that can be ap-
plied to peer groups. In section 3 the proposal for
providing proof of group membership to peers is de-
scribed. Section 4 concludes the paper and gives some
ideas for further research.
2 Related Work
Group access control in peer-to-peer environments
has been discussed in the scientific literature, al-
though not always has been referred with the same
name. In fact, most research has been done in the
field of ad hoc networking, focusing in physical de-
vices.
Different proposals [3, 4] use a symmetric key
model. Roughly speaking, symmetric key models
are the ones that use some secret information shared
among the group peers in order to allow to perform
group access control. This is the most obvious solu-
tion for peer group access control and proof of mem-
bership may be achieved via the direct usage of this
token, simply showing its possession, or with a more
suitable approach, such as using a challenge-response
protocol to prove that a peer is in possession of the
correct key.
However, the main drawbacks of using the sym-
metric model are related to key management and
distribution. The shared key must be transmitted
to new members of the group via an out-of-band
secure channel. Furthermore, if the key has to be
changed (in case of key compromise or in order to
remove a peer from the group), a new key must
be created and transmitted to each member of the
group, which would be equivalent to creating the
whole group again from scratch. On the other hand,
with the symmetric model approach, any peer that is
a member of the group may perform access control.
However, that means that the capability of group
access control cannot be limited to a very specific set
of peers.
Public key models are an alternative to symmetric
key models. Each peer is provided with some infor-
mation which is not shared with the other peers of
the group (a private key), but that will be enough to
prove group membership. Peers do need to exchange
some public data (a public key) that is linked to its
private key, but its distribution does not need a se-
cure channel, since it is considered computationally
unfeasible to deduce the private key from the public
key.
The main concern when asymmetric keys are used
is that authenticity must somehow be guaranteed in
this exchange since, otherwise, an active attacker may
impersonate someone else’s public key with his own.
In order to solve the authenticity of the public keys
two different approaches can be found in the liter-
ature, based on its reliance or not in a certification
authority (CA).
In [5] a centralized CA is proposed. This is the
most straightforward model and assigns the CA role
to a single peer. However, a centralized CA approach
is not a good solution in peer-to-peer networks since
it would have a steep impact on availability, as the
CA must be online in order for a peer to register to
a group or retrieve other peer’s certificates. It also
provides a single point of failure in case of attack. It
also goes against the basic principle of peer equality,
as only the peer with de CA role may register new
members. Availability may be improved by replicat-
ing the CA on n different peers, so it may withstand
n− 1 failures. However, this approach highly reduces
robustness in terms of security, since the system now
provides n points of failure.
In [6] a distributed CA model is used. In this pro-
posal, the CA private key is distributed between a
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specific subset of peers, but without complete repli-
cation of the CA private key. Each peer only knows
a part of the secret and collaboration is needed in or-
der to retrieve it. The CA private key is distributed
among peers using secret sharing schemes [7]. In a
(t, n)-threshold scheme the secret is distributed to n
different peers allowing to compute the secret with
the data of any t peers but obtaining no informa-
tion about the secret in case t− 1 collude. The peers
among which the CA is distributed are called server
nodes. t peers must be present at group initialization
so they can jointly issue certificates to new members.
Furthermore, any peer may retrieve from them au-
thentic copies of the public keys of any other peer
in the group. An additional peer, named combiner,
is the one which adds up all operations from server
nodes into a final result. The proposal tries to mini-
mize impact on availability using threshold schemes,
but the existence of special peers goes against peer
equality in this approach. Furthermore, the work load
on these peers, using the proposed protocol, is really
high.
In a later improvement of the aforementioned pro-
posal [8], the workload is lessened by letting each peer
manage its own copy of the signed public key, instead
of retrieving it from the server nodes each time. This
proposal tries to keep peer equality by eliminating
server nodes and distributing the CA to all the mem-
bers of the group. Any t peers must collaborate to
issue, renew or revoke public keys. The values of pa-
rameters n and t must be allowed to be changed while
the system is running, since otherwise this model is
susceptible to the mobile adversary threat. This is
also important in order to allow the group to grow.
The Cornell On-line Certification Authority -
COCA [9] is also based on a distributed CA model.
This is the first system to integrate a Byzantine
quorum system in order to achieve availability. In
this proposal, defense against mobile adversaries is
achieved using proactive recovery. In addition to
tackling problems associated with combining fault-
tolerance and security, new proactive recovery proto-
cols were developed in this proposal. However, the
proposal reduces the availability, since the protocol
is more complex and efficient group communication
must be guaranteed.
In MOCA [10], a different framework based on
threshold cryptography is proposed. In this case,
the main motivation is providing an efficient certi-
fication protocol, the MOCA Certification Protocol.
This protocol reduces the amount of overhead from
flooding while maintaining an acceptable level of ser-
vice, introducing the concept of β-unicast, where the
client can use multiple unicast connections to replace
flooding if the client has sufficient routes to CA peers
in its routing cache. β represents the sufficient num-
ber of cached routes to use unicast instead of flooding.
DICTATE [11] divides the CA itself in two differ-
ent entities: an oﬄine identification authority (IA)
and an online revocation authority (RA). The IA au-
thenticates the initial binding between a public key
and its subject entity, and the RA keeps track of the
status of certificates issued by the IA. By using this
separation, compromising the online authority (which
is usually more vulnerable than an oﬄine authority)
does not enable the adversary to issue certificates to
new users. This proposal also uses threshold cryp-
tography in order to delegate CA responsibility to
different peers.
The proposal presented in [12] does not rely in a
CA, neither centralized nor distributed, in order to
manage the group. Every peer is responsible for gen-
erating and managing his own public/private key pair
and other mechanisms are used in order to guaran-
tee key authenticity. In this proposal, the concept of
peer group is referred as a troupe. The proposal goes
beyond group membership and tries to provide a dis-
tributed trust relationship between members within
different groups. Members within the same group (or
troupe) collaboratively calculate an RSA accumulator
[13]. The accumulator will be used as group identi-
fier and is considered the public key. The exponent
used by each peer to create the accumulator will be
the private key. Group membership may be proved
via a zero-knowledge protocol for modular exponen-
tiation [14]. In this proposal, different operations for
group joining and dismissal are provided. However,
it needs heavy computation and the fact that a new
key is generated every time a new user joins the group
means that each peer must be effectively online in or-
der to let a new peer join the group. This model also
needs a special unique peer during group member join
or exclusion operations which acts a coordinator, the
troup controller. It must be noted, however, that a
troup controller is not the same as a CA, since it does
not provide authenticity for public keys. It is simply a
coordinator for collaborative operations and any peer
may become a group controller.
Another approach is the Certificateless public key
model. This model uses a public/private key scheme
but no certificates or identifiers are needed. Peers will
directly exchange public keys, which will act as their
identifiers. The main advantage is that it obviates
the need for a naming infrastructure (such as a PKI),
which makes things much simpler. However, such ex-
change must be done over an authentic channel, since
otherwise it is impossible to be sure that the received
public key is really the expected one (and not from an
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intruder). A protocol for public key exchange may be
found in [15], which ensures authenticity via location-
limited channels, that where introduced in the resur-
recting duckling model of interaction [16], but now
using asymmetric cryptography. This approach pro-
vides a mechanism in order to guarantee individual
peer identity, but not group access control. Addi-
tional measures must be taken into account in order
to register whether a specific peer belongs to a group
or not.
Hubaux et alter [17, 18] present a protocol where
peers have a public/private key pair and may gener-
ate and distribute their own certificates with no need
of a trusted third party. Peers sign certificates for
those other peers they trust, in a way similar to the
PGP web of trust [19], trying to take advantage of
the small world phenomenon [20] in order to encom-
pass large groups of peers. Every peer has a list of all
the certificates he has signed (peers he trusts), and
all from those of peers who have created certificates
for him (peers who trust him). When two peers want
to authenticate each other, they exchange both lists
and try to find a trusted path by merging them. In
order to do this, peers must calculate several certifi-
cate validations. This model truly keeps peer equal-
ity and stays within the spirit of an infrastructureless
peer-to-peer network. However, it needs out-of-band
knowledge in order to prove the authenticity of public
keys to be signed by each party.
Another proposal that relies on web of trust may
be found in [21], which is based on node clustering.
Nodes are clustered according to transmission range.
However, the proposal fully focuses on identity man-
agement and is not directly applied to peer group
access control, since it assumes a single global net-
work. To sum up, CA-dependant approaches, and in
particular the distributed CA models, offer a trade of
between availability and security since the CA private
key can be distributed between peers. Furthermore,
peer equality may be fully achieved distributing such
key between all peers in the group. However, the
main drawbacks of this proposals are when they are
applied to a dynamic group since varying the param-
eters in which the CA is distributed may imply re-
computing all shares.
3 A collaborative approach
As discussed in the previous section, the basic concept
of web of trust in PGP is ideal for a peer-to-peer en-
vironment, where all peers are autonomous and share
efforts in order for the network to continue to operate,
without any kind of centralized infrastructure. How-
ever, since it is a fully distributed environment where
it is not possible to rely on single specific peers, cen-
tral certificate repositories cannot be directly used, as
PGP proposes. If peers have to be really autonomous,
each one should manage only its own trust relation-
ships and will need to collaborate and aggregate re-
sources in order to infer trust relationships.
3.1 General definitions
Group access can be split in two steps: registration
and authentication, that are defined as follows.
Registration: The process by which a new peer ap-
plies to be accepted into the group. During this
process the new peer may receive any credentials
(keys, passwords, tokens) that will be needed at
later stages to prove group membership. It is
assumed that registration is initially performed
only once, and, if the process succeeds, the new
peer will be considered a member of the group
afterwards. A registration process may require a
previous invitation or, at least, knowledge of the
existence of the group itself.
Authentication: The process by which a user con-
nects to a group, proving he is one of its mem-
bers. The previous registration process provides
the needed evidences for the authentication pro-
cedure. In this environment connection is equiv-
alent to the possibility to share some resources.
The following notation will be used for the rest
of paper in order to clarify the description of group
membership procedures:
• Let G = {A1, A2, · · · , An} be the peers of the
group G.
• Let B be the new peer who wants to join the
group.
• Let ΓR = {Ai1 , Ai2 , · · · , Air ; ij ∈
{1, · · · , n};∀j = 1, · · · , r} be the registra-
tion structure within a group. That is, the set of
r peers who are allowed to register a new peer.
• Let A be a peer who is already part the group
and belongs to ΓR.
• Let C be a peer who is already part the group
but does not belong to ΓR.
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3.2 Group membership trust model
Authentication in a web of trust depends on a path
of trusted intermediaries that will travel from the au-
thenticating peer to the one to be authenticated. This
intermediaries are defined as introducers. When a
peer trusts an introducer, it implies a certain confi-
dence on the capability of the introducer to provide
faithful certificates. If a path really exists between
both peers, the identity may be confirmed via the
evaluation of the trustworthiness of each introducer’s
key. Otherwise the user’s identity cannot really be
confirmed and no real information is obtained from
the web of trust.
The different trust relationships in a web of trust
are usually represented as a directed graph, where
edges represent trust relationships, as shown in fig-
ure 1. Here, for example, Z trusts Y , which also
serves as an introducer for both X and U . That
means Z may authenticate X and U via Y .
Figure 1: Web of trust representation
In order to use web of trust concepts in our model
for group access control, trust relationships are trans-
lated to proof of group membership. Whenever peer
A creates a trust relationship with peer B, it is acting
as an introducer to B for the rest of the group mem-
bers. This means that A is vouching for B’s group
membership to other group members. In the case
presented in figure 1, Z acts as an introducer for Y ,
which also acts as a introducer for X and U .
In our model, two different sets of peers exist within
a peer group: one composed by peers that belong to
ΓR (those which are allowed to register new mem-
bers), and another composed by the rest of group
members, G r ΓR. At this moment, no initial as-
sumption is made regarding the cardinality of both
sets or how a peer becomes part of each set, but it is
obvious that it is necessary that ΓR 6= ∅ in order for
new peers to be able to join the group.
Since two different sets of peers exist within G, two
different types of trust relationships are distinguished
between peers, depending on which set both peers be-
long. Both types of trust relationships are created in
the same way they are created in a standard web of
trust, by signing the trusted peer public key, gener-
ating a certificate with a specific date of expiration.
The created certificate specifies which kind of trust
relationship it is for. Both trust relationships rein-
force the fact that a peer is member of the group.
Patron relationships are established from peers
which belong to ΓR to a peer which does not belong
to ΓR. These trust relationships are unidirectional,
just like the typical web of trust relationship. When
peer A signs peer B’s key, it will be considered to be
its patron within the group.
Backbone relationships are established between
peers which both belong to ΓR, but are considered
to be bidirectional. In order to create, backbone rela-
tionships, both peers always sign each other’s public
key.
An example of these different sets of peers and
types of trust relationships is shown in figure 2. Grey
peers are those which belong to ΓR, and white ones
do not belong. Backbone relationships between peers
are marked as bidirectional arrows, whereas patron
relationships are marked as unidirectional arrows.
Figure 2: Initial group membership trust graph
It must be taken into account that in a global over-
lay network different peer groups must transparently
operate. Under this model, each peer group manages
membership with its own web of trust, which means
that some number of independent webs of trust will
coexist. In order to achieve this, each signature is
binded to the specific group the patron peer is vouch-
ing, and will only be valid for operations regarding
that specific group. This is done via including the
group id into the signature. A peer may hold differ-
ent signatures from the same patron, but each one
binded to different peer groups.
Since peers are autonomous, each one exclusively
manages only the information concerned about itself.
This means that each peer will have information re-
lated to:
• Its own private/public key pair.
• The signatures from other peers.
• The list of peers trusted by him.
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In order to access any other information, other peers
must be asked to provide it.
Even though in PGP there are several degrees of
trust (none, marginal and complete), and proposals
for ad hoc networking exist which take into account
trust evaluation in path validation and focus on how
to assign specific values to trust [21, 22, 23], only two
different degrees are initially considered under this
model: whether the relationship exists or not (0 or 1
respectively).
3.3 Group membership services
Once the basic trust model has been described, how
to provide the basic group membership services will
be detailed. A list of group management services and
dynamics may be found in [24]. However, it does not
identify the difference between group registration and
authentication. We will also focus on those services
related to single operations, since bulk operations can
be reduced to an aggregation of simple operations.
The proposal is meant to be able to adapt to a
wide range of group policies and membership regis-
tration and authentication scenarios. A classification
for such scenarios is presented in [25], according to
the degree of involvement of peers in the registration
and authentication process.
3.3.1 Group setup
In the case that a single peer decides to create a new
group, no trust relationships are needed, and the peer
decides whether it will be part of ΓR or not. It must
be noted, however, that in the latter case the group
will never be able to grow, so it is an impractical
decision.
If instead of a single peer, a set of n peers want
to create a group, the process can be divided as the
initial group setup described here, where the initial
peer does belong to ΓR, and n− 1 membership regis-
trations, explained as follows.
3.3.2 Group registration
In order for a new peer, B, to register to the group, it
must apply for membership to any peer which belongs
to ΓR, such as A. If agreement is reached, a patron
relationship is established and A becomes B’s patron
for this group. The model does not impose any re-
striction on deciding why a new peer is accepted into
the group. This decision will be up to the group poli-
cies or the individual decision of A, and goes beyond
the scope of the model.
Since signatures expire, B should renew its rela-
tionship with some patron (usually, the same as in the
initial registration) when the expiration date nears.
The model also accommodates to the possibility
that n peers may become patrons of B. Under this
assumption, such relationships may be created once
B is already part of the group or the precise moment
of group registration. Any peer in G r ΓR may ask
for more patrons at any time. This assumption en-
ables the group to provide redundancy in order to
solve possible availability problems as it is shown in
section 3.3.4. Furthermore, this enables implement-
ing stricter group policies or scenarios where a minu-
mum number of patrons must be collected before B
is considered to be part of the group. A list of such
scenarios may be found in [25]. Under this policy,
group membership cannot be achieved with a single
patron, reinforcing security at the cost of a more agile
registration procedure.
3.3.3 Change of role
At some time, any peer may decide to become part
of ΓR. On this regard, the model does not en-
force any rules for creation of backbone relationships,
imposing no restrictions on group behavior at this
level. Since it encompasses a completely open net-
work where peers self-organize and collaborate in or-
der to achieve basic operations, it considers that any
peer which is part of the group may apply to become
part of ΓR at any time, just like it may apply to join
the group. Group policies or strategies will decide
if this peer is granted such role change. In fact, it
may be completely possible that G = ΓR, fulfilling
total peer equality. As peers which belong to ΓR per-
form more operations, it is expected that only those
nodes with sufficient computer power or bandwidth
will apply.
It may also be possible that a peer A decides to
leave ΓR for some reason. First of all, A must an-
nounce those peers under its patronage its intention
so they can find new patrons (in the case that each
peer that does not belong to ΓR only has one patron).
Until that happens, A cannot leave ΓR.
Then, A must also tell each of those peers with
a shared backbone relationship its intention. All of
them are known to him, since each peer keeps the list
of peers which trust him in the form of signed certifi-
cates. All of them now become its patrons, changing
their relationships. If such any peer, D, is currently
off-line, A will wait until that peer reconnects (while
D is oﬄine, the fact that there is a backbone rela-
tionship pending to be revoked does not affect the
system, since D will never interact with the group),
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or its certificate signed by D expires. Since in back-
bone relationships both certificates are created at the
same moment, it will also mean that the certificate
signed by A that D keeps will also be expired, so the
relationship is completely over. At that moment, A
no longer need try to contact D.
In the case thatD is the only peerA has a backbone
relationship with, A cannot leave ΓR unless A wants
to lose group membership.
All this process is summarized in figure 3.
Figure 3: Change of role from ΓR
3.3.4 Membership authentication
In order for a peer C to provide proof of membership,
a trust path must be found between the authenticat-
ing peer and C. Both kinds of trust relationships are
eligible when searching this path. However, this trust
path must accomplish the addditional condition that
all contained signatures must be binded to the peer
group C is trying to access. In figure 4 a case is shown
where A may be able to correctly authenticate C as
a group member.
Figure 4: Finding a trust path between two peers
This model contemplates the possibility that some
peers, those in G\ΓR, have insufficient information
in order to authenticate, even in the case that all
peers are online. The reason which motivates this is
providing the model with the capability to be adapted
to specific group policies that need such restriction.
In order to minimize the length of certification
chains in the proposed model, when A successfully
authenticates C, A checks whether it shares a back-
bone relationship with C’s patron. If it does not exist,
a new one is automatically created. As the group life
progresses, peers which belong to ΓR will eventually
create a connected graph. From that moment, any
peer in ΓR may authenticate any other peer in G in
two hops.
This is shown if figure 5. In (a) an initial state
is presented. When A authenticates C, a new back-
bone trust relationships is created (b). Eventually,
full connectivity is achieved in (c).
Figure 5: Complete graph backbone progress
The creation of multiple patron relationships is im-
portant in order to avoid those cases where authenti-
cation might fail because insufficient peers are online,
a key issue in peer-to-peer and adhoc newtorks. For
example, in figure 5 case (a), should peer D somehow
become unavailable, it would be impossible for C to
provide proof of group membership to A, since a trust
path could not be retrieved. This problem is solved
in cases (b) and (c), via the eventual growth of the
backbone relationship connected graph.
4 Conclusions and further work
In this paper a method for access control in peer
groups using a web of trust has been presented. The
main contributions are twofold. First of all, its abil-
ity to adapt to a broad range of group policies and
group membership scenarios, providing necessary ca-
pabilities in order to be more restrictive or open when
needed. Also, the proposal minimizes de length of
certification paths in order to avoid the validation of
long certification chains, which is the main problem
in several current methods.
Further work includes how to provide an effec-
tive method for efficient certificate management and
membership revocation mechanisms. Another goal
deemed interesting for the proposed model is how
to adapt it in order to include some degree of peer
anonymity within a group.
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